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There were a number of interesting developments affecting Oklahoma civil
procedure during the past year. One topic that received considerable attention
from court clerks and attorneys early in 1997 was the problem of giving notice
of the filing of the judgment to the parties to the action. This problem was
eventually resolved by a series of amendments to the Judgments Act,' which
now require the party who files a judgment with the court clerk to mail file-
stamped copies of it to all the other parties to the action so that they will know
when the time for filing the post-trial motions and an appeal begins to run.
The most significant case law development was the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's decision in YMCA v. Melson,2 which allowed discovery of a
defendant's financial records when a plaintiff is seeking punitive damages. In
another interesting case, Cary by and through Cary v. Oneok, Inc.,3 a divided
Supreme Court ruled that a litigant should not be excluded from a trial solely
on the grounds that his disfigurement might prejudice the jury.
There were also a number of appellate decisions during the past year that
t Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. See Act of April 15, 1997, ch. 102, §§ 1-7, 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws 320, 320-27.
2. 1997 OK 81, 944 P.2d 304.
3. 1997 OK 60, 940 P.2d 201.
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dealt with a variety of topics such as personal jurisdiction,4 suits against unin-
corporated associations, 5 interpleader,6 and claim and issue preclusion.' In
addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court continued to restrict the availability of
summary judgments by placing the burden of showing the .absence of substan-
tial controversy as to the material facts on the moving party, rather than requir-
ing the party with the burden of proof at trial to produce evidence of a substan-
tial controversy.' The Supreme Court also once again expressed its disfavor of
interfering with a jury verdict.9
Another development concerns the Oklahoma Supreme Court's adoption of
the public domain citation system. As a result of amendments to the Supreme
Court Rules,'" attorneys will have to learn new forms for the citation of cases.
While the Supreme Court and Court of Civil Appeals have already adjusted to
the new citation forms, it may take many attorneys considerably longer to
change their ways of citing cases.
These developments are described more fully in the following pages.
I. PUBLIC DOMAIN CITATION
Beginning January 1, 1998, the Oklahoma Supreme Court requires the
public domain citation form for all Oklahoma appellate decisions promulgated
after May 1, 1997, and it is strongly encouraged for decisions promulgated
before then pursuant to Rule 1.200(e)." The public domain citation system
conforms with the system that has been proposed by the American Association
of Law Libraries and the American Bar Association.'3 Oklahoma was the
first state to adopt the public domain citation system for its entire body of case
law.'4 The Oklahoma Supreme Court is in the process of providing public ac-
cess to all Oklahoma case law on its Oklahoma Supreme Court Network
("OSCN") web-site at "www.oscn.net".' 5
The public domain citation system is tied to the database of Oklahoma
case law on the OSCN. Every opinion of the Oklahoma appellate courts is
4. See Ferrell v. Prairie Int'l Trucks, Inc., 1997 OK 6, 935 P.2d 286.
5. See A-Plus Janitorial & Carpet Cleaning v. Employers' Workers' Compensation Ass'n, 1997 OK 37,
936 P.2d 916; Oliver v. Farmers Ins. Group of Cos., 1997 OK 71, 941 P.2d 985.
6. See Stanford v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 1996 OK Civ APP 156, 936 P.2d 352; Aircraft Equip.
Co. v. The Kiowa Tribe, 1997 OK 62, 939 P.2d 1143.
7. See Deloney v. Downey, 1997 OK 102, 944 P.2d 312; National Diversified Business Servs., Inc. v.
Corporate Fin. Opportunities, Inc., 1997 OK 36, 946 P.2d 622.
8. See Ingram v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1997 OK 11, 932 P.2d 1128.
9. See Currens v. Hampton, 1997 OK 58, 939 P.2d 1138.
10. See In re. Amendments to the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, and Rules on Administration of
Courts, 1997 OK 54, 68 OKLA. BJ. 1543 (1997).
11. See id.
12. See The Universal Legal Citation Project: A Draft User Guide to the AALL Universal Case Citation,
89 L. LIB. J. 7 (1997).
13. ABA Official Citation Resolutions at <http:llwww.abaneLorglcitationlresolution.html>.
14. See Notice, Oklahoma Adopts Public Domain Citation, 68 OKLA. B.J. 1541 (1997).
15. For a useful article on the Oklahoma Supreme Court Network, see Michael Wilds, Successfully Navi-
gating the OSCN, A Pragmatic Guide to Legal Research, 59 OKLA. BJ. 3421 (1997).
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being assigned a case number, and the public domain citation system requires
the citation to include the name of the case, its year, the designation of the
court, the case number, and a parallel citation to West's National Reporter
System. The example of a case citation used in the Supreme Court Rules 6 is:
Skinner v. Braum's Ice Cream Store, 1995 OK 11, 890 P.2d 922. Locations
within opinions are to be designated by paragraph number, rather than by page
number, because the pagination is keyed to West's National Reporter System.
Opinions that are promulgated after May 1, 1997 include the case and
paragraph numbering in their published form that appears in the Oklahoma Bar
Journal and the Pacific Reporter. Thus, one does not need to navigate the world
wide web to find the public domain citation for these opinions. Use of the
world wide web is required for earlier opinions, but the public domain citation
system is not mandatory, but only strongly encouraged, for pre-May 1, 1997
decisions. By including the parallel citation to West's National Reporter Sys-
tem, the public domain citation system will not make the Pacific Reporter obso-
lete, and attorneys may still use it for legal research. The public domain citation
is meant to provide an alternative to the monopoly that West's National Report-
er System has enjoyed for many years.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's bold steps in establishing the Oklahoma
Supreme Court Network and adopting the public domain system provide Okla-
homa attorneys with a compelling additional reason to become acquainted with
the on-line world.' While the adoption of the public domain citation may be
the most exciting devopment, there were also a number of case law develop-
ments relating to civil procedure, which are discussed on the following pages.
H. JURISDICON AND VENUE
The Oklahoma Supreme Court examined Oklahoma's far reaching long
arm statute at section 2004(F) of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes" in Ferrell
v. Prairie Int'l Trucks, Inc." Section 2004(F) extends the jurisdiction of Okla-
homa courts over non-residents to the maximum extent that due process allows
under the Oklahoma and United States Constitutions. The Ferrell case arose out
of the plaintiff's purchase of a truck from the defendant corporation, whose
principal place of business was in Illinois. The purchase took place in St. Louis,
Missouri, but the defendant knew that the plaintiff intended to license it in
Oklahoma, and the defendant authorized the plaintiff to have certain repair
work on the truck done in Oklahoma. After the truck broke down in Arkansas,
the plaintiff brought his action in an Oklahoma state court in which he alleged
claims for breach of warranty, conversion, and breach of contract against the
16. See R. 1.200(e)(1), In re. Amendments to the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules, and Rules on Admin-
istration of Courts, 1997 OK 54, 68 OKLA. BJ. 1543 (1997).
17. For a useful article detailing legal information available on-line, see Mike Wilds, A Practitioner's
Guide to Free Legal Information on the Internet, 33 TULsA L. J. 463 (1997).
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004(F) (1991).
19. 1997 OK 6, 935 P.2d 286.
1997]
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defendant2 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed.
Although the defendant did not conduct business in Oklahoma, the Su-
preme Court found a number of contacts on which to base jurisdiction. These
included the defendant's running advertisements for its trucks in a publication
that was distributed in Oklahoma and targeted at Oklahoma residents.2 The
advertisements did not give rise to the plaintiff's claim, however, because the
plaintiff did not see them before he purchased the truck.' Other of the
defendant's activities that were more closely connected with the plaintiff's
claim appeared to be of greater significance for purposes of jurisdiction. Among
these were the defendant's negotiation for the sale of the truck by telephone
with the plaintiff, knowing that the plaintiff was in Oklahoma and that the truck
would be used in Oklahoma.' In addition, the Supreme Court stressed that the
defendant created a continuing relationship with Oklahoma by entering into an
installment contract with the plaintiff and giving the plaintiff a warranty on the
truck.24 Accordingly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the defendant
had subjected itself to the jurisdiction of Oklahoma state courts.
The often subtle distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and venue
was the subject of Robinson v. Oklahoma Employment Security Comm'n.' The
plaintiff filed a timely appeal from a denial of unemployment benefits. Unfortu-
nately, he filed the appeal in the wrong county, and by the time he discovered
his error, it was too late to file in the proper county. 6 The trial court denied
the plaintiff's motion to transfer the appeal to the proper county, but the Okla-
homa Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the provision in the statute
designating the location for filing an appeal was a matter of venue, rather than
subject matter jurisdiction. It adopted the principle that restrictions on the par-
ticular county or location within the state that an action must be brought are
matters of venue, rather than jurisdictionY Having decided that the statutory
limitation did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff's
motion to transfer the case to the proper venue.'
In Rishell v. Jane Phillips Episcopal Memorial Medical Ctr.,29 the Okla-
homa Court of Civil Appeals scrutinized a commonly utilized provision in the
Oklahoma venue statutes. 0 Section 139 of title 12 provides that a civil action
20. See id. at 110, 935 P.2d at 287.
21. See id. at 113, 935 P.2d at 288.
22. See id. at 16, 935 P.2d at 287.
23. See id. at 113, 935 P.2d at 288.
24. See id.
25. 1997 OK 5, 932 P.2d 1120.
26. See id. at 1, 932 P.2d at 1121. Under OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 2-610 (1991), the appeal should have
been filed in the district court of the county where the plaintiff resided, which was Kay County. Instead, the
appeal was filed in the district court for Oklahoma County.
27. See id. at '1, 932 P.2d at 1123.
28. See id. at 112, 932 P.2d at 1123.
29. 1996 OK Civ APP 112, 934 P.2d 360.
30. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 139 (1991).
[Vol. 33:539
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may be brought in any county in which any defendant resides or may be "sum-
moned."'3 Rishell was a medical malpractice case that was brought against a
doctor and a hospital in Washington County. The doctor also maintained an
office in Rogers County, and the plaintiff managed to have him served with
process there. The Court of Civil Appeals held that venue was therefore proper
in Rogers County.32 A number of years ago Professor Fraser criticized the
Oklahoma statute basing venue on where a defendant was summoned, saying
that it "is inconsistent with the idea that an action should be brought in a fair
and convenient place."'33 Even so, the statute is clear, and the Oklahoma Court
of Civil Appeals was correct in finding venue in the county where the doctor
was served.
The Oklahoma appellate courts also issued a number of opinions involving
other important aspects of pretrial procedure. The decisions dealing with plead-
ing, discovery and summary judgments are covered in the next section.
Ill. PLEADING, DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals issued an interesting opinion deal-
ing with the effect of bankruptcy on Oklahoma's savings statute24 In Don
Huddleston Constr. Co. v. United Bank & Trust Co.,35 the plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed their breach of contract action against the defendants after the defen-
dants filed for bankruptcy protection. Two months after the dismissal of the
bankruptcy, the plaintiffs sought to reassert their claims against the defendants.
The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by section 108(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code,36 because both the original three year statute of limita-
tion and the one year savings provision had expired.' Under Section 108(c), a
creditor has only thirty days after the termination of the automatic stay in bank-
ruptcy in which to file a claim that would otherwise be barred by the applicable
statute of limitation. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the one
year savings provision was suspended during the period that the bankruptcy
proceeding was pending.38 Thus, the plaintiffs had one year, rather than only
thirty days, after the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding in which to
reassert their claims.
In Johnson v. Goodman,39 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an or-
der of a trial court striking a petition is not a dismissal. As a consequence, the
underlying action remains open so that the plaintiff can file a new petition
31. See id.
32. Rishell, 1996 OK CIV APP 112, at (7, 934 P.2d at 362.
33. George B. Fraser, Venue Oklahoma Style, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 182, 184 (1970).
34. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1991).
35. 1996 OK Qv APP 133, 933 P.2d 944.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1994).
37. See Don Huddleston Constr. Co., 1996 OK CIV APP 133, '111-2, 933 P.2d at 945.
38. See id. at 1 1,933 P.2d at 947-48.
39. 1997 OK 77, 941 P.2d 990.
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arising from the same set of facts without having to commence a new action.'"
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled in the Johnson case that the plaintiff's new
petition was not barred by the statute of limitation even though it was filed
more than one year after the order striking the petition.4
In Wright v. Parks,42 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals applied the
provisions in the Oklahoma Pleading Code4 that require the court to allow a
plaintiff leave to amend if it grants a motion to dismiss and the defect can be
remedied. The plaintiff did not file his response to the defendants' motion to
dismiss within the appropriate time and he failed to appear at the hearing on the
motion." Nevertheless, the Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the plaintiff
should have been given an opportunity to amend his petition to state a claim
and that the trial court should have specified a time within which an amended
petition could be filed, instead of dismissing the action.'
YMCA v. Melson" was probably the most significant decision relating to
civil procedure during the past year. This case involved the discovery of finan-
cial records in a case where the plaintiff was seeking punitive damages. For the
past twenty years, Oklahoma courts have followed Cox v. Theus,7 which held
that a defendant's financial records were not subject to discovery even though
the plaintiff was seeking punitive damages. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
decided in the YMCA case that the holding in Cox was no longer controlling,
because it was decided before the adoption of the Oklahoma Discovery Code in
1981. Under the discovery procedure that existed at the time of the Cox case, a
party was allowed to obtain production of documents only on a showing of
good cause.' With the adoption of the Oklahoma Discovery Code, good cause
is no longer required; instead, the party opposing discovery has the burden of
showing good cause in order to obtain a protective order to limit discovery."
Accordingly, where a party's financial records are relevant to the subject matter
of the action, their discovery should be permitted, subject to the court's authori-
ty to issue a protective order to safeguard the confidentiality of such records as
federal tax returns.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the procedures for disqualification
of counsel in Piette v. Bradley & Leseberg.' It held that an order disquali-
fying counsel for a conflict of interest was immediately appealable as a final
order under section 953 of title 122 The Supreme Court also required the trial
40. Id. at 17, 941 P.2d at 991-92.
41. Id. at 119, 941 P.2d at 992.
42. 1997 OK CIv APP 15, 939 P.2d 20.
43. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2012(G) (1991).
44. See Wright, 1997 OK Civ APP 15, 939 P.2d 20.
45. See id. at (111, 939 P.2d at 22.
46. 1997 OK 81, 944 P.2d 304.
47. 1977 OK 158, 10, 569 P.2d 447.
48. See Cox, 1997 OK 81, at 110, 944 P.2d at 307.
49. See id. at 1t14-15, 944 P.2d at 308.
50. See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1997). Federal income tax records are confidential.
51. 1996 OK 124,930 P.2d 183.
52. OK.A. STAT. tit. 12, § 953 (1991).
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court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the attorney should
be disqualified and to make a specific finding as to whether the attorney had
knowledge of material and confidential information. 3
The Oklahoma Supreme Court emphasized the role of the pleadings in
framing the issues in the case in Reddell v. Johnson.4 The plaintiff brought a
negligence action to recover damages from being shot in the eye during a BB
gun war. The defendant denied the allegations of negligence and asserted the
affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. The
defendant then moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the
motion on the ground that liability was barred by the defense of assumption of
risk 5 On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, but on a different theo-
ry. The Court of Civil Appeals decided that the case was for assault and bat-
tery, rather than negligence, and therefore, it was barred by the one year statute
of limitations.56 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals be-
cause the defendant had not asserted the statute of limitations defense in his
answer, but it affirmed the trial court on the ground that there was no negli-
gence shown 7
In Reddell, the Court of Civil Appeals relied on the general appellate princi-
ple that a trial court should be affirmed on appeal even though it reached its
result through incorrect reasoning if there is any correct basis for its decision
This principle saves the courts the trouble of having to send a case back so that
the trial court will modify its decision to reflect the correct reasoning. Neverthe-
less, the Court of Civil Appeals should not have decided the case on a theory
that had not been advanced by the parties because it is for the parties rather
than the courts to frame the issues in the case.
The main difference between the use of summary judgments in federal and
Oklahoma state courts is the Oklahoma Supreme Court's rejection of the
Celotex line of cases from the federal courts. Under Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,9
a federal court should grant a summary judgment if, after being given sufficient
opportunity for discovery, a plaintiff is unable to provide sufficient evidence to
put on a prima facie case at trialY° In contrast, in Oklahoma state courts, the
defendant has the burden of showing that there is no substantial controversy as
to any material fact.6' In a number of cases, neither party is able to offer evi-
dence of a material fact, and a defendant in an Oklahoma state court could not
obtain summary judgment in one of these cases, even though the plaintiff would
53. 1996 OK 124, 12, 930 P.2d at 184.
54. 1997 OK 86, 942 P.2d 200.
55. See id. at 3, 942 P.2d at 202.
56. See id. at 4, 942 P.2d at 202.
57. See id. at I]9-10,21, 942 P.2d at 202.
58. See id. at ( 5, 942 P.2d at 202.
59. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
60. See id. at 322-323.
61. See White v. Wynn, 1985 OK 89, 18, 708 P.2d 1126, 1128 ("On a motion for summary judgment
under District Court Rule 13 (12 O.S. Ch. 2, App.) all inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the un-
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not be able to get past a demurrer to the evidence at trial. Ingram v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.62 illustrates the difference between the standard for summary judg-
ment in the federal and Oklahoma state courts. The Ingram case involved a slip
and fall in a Wal-Mart store in which the trial court granted summary judgment
because the plaintiff had no firsthand knowledge of the cause of her fall or that
Wal-Mart caused or contributed to the condition that caused her fall. The Su-
preme Court reversed, and it ruled that the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the
cause of the fall or whether Wal-Mart knew of it was immaterial to the summa-
ry judgment motion.63 Unless Wal-Mart could prove that it did not know of
the dangerous condition, there would be a fact question that would preclude
granting summary judgment. In contrast, at trial, the plaintiff would have the
burden of proving the cause of her fall and Wal-Mart's knowledge of the dan-
gerous condition. Thus, if she was unable to produce any more evidence at trial
than she did in response to the summary judgment motion, the trial court would
be required to grant a demurrer to the evidence at the close of her case.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also reversed a summary judgment in
Bookout v. Great Plains Regional Medical Ctr.' In Bookout, the Supreme
Court stressed the need for a plaintiff to be given a reasonable opportunity to
respond to a motion for summary judgment. It found that the trial judge had
abused his discretion by denying the plaintiff's motion for a two day continu-
ance in order to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The defendant
filed its motion for summary judgment shortly before the Christmas holidays in
1995. After the plaintiff learned that her counsel had failed to secure an expert
witness, she retained new counsel who immediately sought a continuance from
defense counsel. The defense counsel granted a short continuance, and the new
plaintiff's counsel was able to retain two expert witnesses. The plaintiff then
filed a motion for another continuance on January 3, and at the hearing on the
motion, she requested two additional days to provide the court with affidavits
from her expert witnesses.' The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a
continuance and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff's second attorney was not guilty of a lack
of diligence and that a two day continuance was not unreasonable under the
circumstances.67 The shortness of the requested continuance and the holiday
season appeared to be important considerations in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion.
Joinder of claims and parties was another area that the Oklahoma appellate
courts addressed, and several of the significant cases in this area are discussed
62. 1997 OK 11, 932 P.2d 1128.
63. See id. at %, 932 P.2d at 1130.
64. See Rogers v. Hennessee, 1979 OK 138, 1, 602 P.2d 1033, 1035 ("When passing upon a demurrer
to the evidence, the trial court must consider as true all evidence favorable to the party against whom the test
of sufficiency is directed, together with all reasonably drawn inferences therefrom, and must disregard all
conflicting evidence favorable to the demurrant.").
65. 1997 OK 38, 939 P.2d 1131.
66. See id. at 94, 939 P.2d at 1133.
67. See id. at 14, 939 P.2d at 1135.
[Vol. 33:539
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below.
IV. JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND PARTIES
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided a number of cases during the past
year that involved the joinder of claims and parties. A-Plus Janitorial & Carpet
Cleaning v. Employer's Workers' Compensation Ass'n,' involved an action
against an unincorporated association by some of its former members. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that the action could not be brought as a
derivative action under Oklahoma's counterpart to Federal Rule 23.1' because
the interests of the former members were antagonistic to the unincorporated
association. Therefore, they were nqt acting on its behalf and were adequate
representatives of the unincorporated association." However, the Supreme
Court remanded the case so that the trial court could determine whether the
action should proceed with the former members asserting their individual claims
in the same action7' pursuant to the Oklahoma counterparts to Federal Rules
18 and 20.2
Oliver v. Farmers Ins. Group of Companies" also involved a suit against
an unincorporated association. The Supreme Court ruled that an unincorporated
association could be sued under its common name pursuant to section 182 of
title W. Thus, it allowed the plaintiff to assert a bad faith claim against the
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies along with its bad faith claim against
the Farmers Insurance Company, Inc.75
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided in Chickasaw Telephone Co. v.
Drabek6 that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide a case that affected
an absent person's rights. The case arose out of a dispute concerning the
plaintiff's easement across property that was owned by the defendant and his
wife. The trial court issued a temporary injunction against both the defendant
and his wife from interfering with the plaintiff's rights to the easement. The
wife was not served with process, did not enter an appearance in the case or
otherwise submit herself to the court's jurisdiction, and she was not represented
by counsel in the case.2 Because the wife was affected by the injunction, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that she was a necessary party, and since the
trial court did not have jurisdiction over her, the temporary injunction was void
68. 1997 OK 37, 936 P.2d 916.
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023.1 (1991).
70. See A-Plus Janitorial & Carpet Cleaning, 1997 OK 37, at 115, 936 P.2d at 925.
71. See id. at 118, 936 P.2d at 926.
72. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2018, 2020 (1991).
73. 1997 OK 71, 941 P.2d 985.
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 182 (1991).
75. See Oliver, 1997 OK 71, at 16, 941 P.2d at 988.
76. 1996 OK 76, 921 P.2d 333.
77. See id. at 13, 921 P.2d at 335.
1997]
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as to her.7 The Chickasaw opinion failed to cite to section 2019 of title 12,"'
the Oklahoma counterpart to Federal Rule 19, which appeared to be applicable
because of the wife's interest in the land that was burdened by the easement."
Nevertheless, it remanded the case for a determination whether she was a neces-
sary party,8" as section 2019 would require.
Two recent cases involved the use of interpleader. In Stanford v. Fidelity
& Guaranty Life Insurance Co.,' the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held
that a life insurer that had been sued by the widow of its insured should have
been allowed to file a counterclaim for interpleader in which it joined the
insured's ex-wife as a competing claimant. The other interpleader case was
Aircraft Equipment Co. v. The Kiowa Tribe,3 where the Oklahoma Supreme
Court upheld the use of interpleader in a post-judgment proceeding to enforce a
judgment that the plaintiff had obtained against an Indian tribe. The plaintiff
sought to collect its judgment from funds belonging to the tribe that were in the
possession of the tribe's tax collector and also from oil and gas entities that
owed taxes to the tribe." The oil and gas entities interplead the funds owed to
the tribe, and the Supreme Court decided that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering these funds paid into the court."
There were a number of decisions dealing with various aspects of trial
procedure, including the exclusion of litigants because of their disfigurement,
the calling of rebuttal witnesses, and appellate review of new trial orders. These
are discussed below along with two decisions involving the compelling of arbi-
tration.
V. TRIAL PROCEDURE AND ARBIrRATIONS
The circumstances under which a litigant may be excluded from trial were
the subject of Cary by and through Cary v. Oneok, Inc.,86 After a child was
severely burned by the explosion of a water heater in the garage of his home,
his mother brought an action on his behalf. At trial, the defendant moved for
bifurcation of the trial so that the liability phase would be tried separately from
the damages phase. The defendant also requested that the child be excluded
from the liability phase. The trial court excluded the plaintiff's son, who was 6
years old by the time of trial, from appearing at trial on the ground that his
disfigurement would cause undue prejudice to the defendant.' The Supreme
Court reversed. It was careful not to hold that a party to a lawsuit had an abso-
78. See id. at (19, 921 P.2d at 337.
79. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2019 (1991).
80. See Chickasaw Telephone Co., 1996 OK 76, 2, 921 P.2d at 335.
81. See id. at 111, 921 P.2d at 337.
82. 1996 OK Civ APP 156, 936 P.2d 352.
83. 1997 OK 62, 939 P.2d 1143.
84. See id. at c13, 939 P.2d at 1145.
85. See id. at (12, 939 P.2d at 1149.
86. 1997 OK 60, 940 P.2d 201.
87. See id. at 3, 940 P.2d at 202.
[Vol. 33:539
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss2/4
DEVELOPMENTS IN OKLAHOMA CIVIL PROCEDURE
lute right to attend a trial, noting that a party's disruptive behavior may warrant
exclusion in some circumstances." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decided
that exclusion of a party was disfavored and that a party should not be excluded
solely because of disfigurement. 9 Justice Opala (joined by three other Justices)
dissented, pointing out that the child was not a party to the action9 and no
prejudice to the plaintiff's case resulted from his exclusion from the liability
phase because he was not listed in the pretrial order as a witness.9 On the oth-
er hand, the dissent argued, based on the trial court's finding that the boy's
appearance at trial would cause prejudice to the defendant, the trial court acted
within its discretion in excluding the child.'
In Aggressive Carriers, Inc. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co.,'3 the Oklaho-
ma Court of Civil Appeals addressed the issue of who is a rebuttal witness and
therefore may testify at trial, even though the witness is not listed in a pretrial
conference order. The case arose out an accident involving two semi-trucks.
There was only one eyewitness to the accident other than the two drivers. Al-
though the eyewitness was listed in the accident report, her name did not appear
in the pretrial conference order because the plaintiff did not locate her until 8
days before the trial. Once the plaintiff located the eyewitness, it immediately
notified the defendant's counsel, but the day before trial the defendant objected
to the plaintiff's use of the witness at trial, either as a witness in chief or a
rebuttal witness.94 The trial judge refused to allow the witness to testify on the
ground that her testimony would be cumulative to other testimony, and the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The standard that the appellate
court used in determining whether a witness was a rebuttal witness was whether
the testimony was relevant solely on account of the effect it had on evidence
iptroduced by opposing witnesses.95 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
concluded that the plaintiff's witness was not a rebuttal witness because her
testimony was directed to bolstering the plaintiff's case in chief.' Consequent-
ly, her testimony could have been introduced only in the plaintiff's case in
chief.
Bloustine v. Fagin9' concerned the respective roles of the judge and jury
in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiff sued his former attorneys for failure to
perfect an appeal from a divorce decree. He claimed that if the appeal had been
properly perfected, the appellate court would have reversed the trial court's
decision. The trial judge in the malpractice action decided, however, that the
88. See id. at 13, 940 P.2d at 204.
89. See id. at 9[14, 940 P.2d at 204.
90. See id. at (2, 940 P.2d at 206 (Opala, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 3, n.8, 940 P.2d at 207 (Opala, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 917-18, 940 P.2d at 213 (Opala, J., dissenting).
93. 1997 OK Civ APP 31, 941 P.2d 1011.
94. See id. at 18, 941 P.2d at 1013.
95. See id. at 115, 941 P.2d at 1013.
96. See id. at 117, 941 P.2d at 1014.
97. 1996 OK Civ APP 122, 928 P.2d 964.
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appeal would not have been successful even if it had been properly perfected.9"
The plaintiff contended that this should have been an issue for a jury, but the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ruled that this was a legal issue, which was
correctly decided by the trial judge. The reason that the probable outcome of an
appeal is a legal issue is that had the appeal been properly perfected, its out-
come would have been determined by the appellate court, rather than a jury."
In Currens v. Hampton,"°° the Oklahoma Supreme Court reaffirmed its
opposition to interference with a jury's determination of damages, where there
is no error of law or showing of bias. 1 After a jury awarded the parents of
an 11 year old child who died during an appendectomy $1.5 million, the trial
court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Court of Civil Appeals
ordered a remittitur of $500,000, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court stated that the
following standard should be applied in evaluating whether a verdict is exces-
sive:
The established rule is that before a verdict of a jury may be set aside as
excessive, it must appear that the verdict is so excessive as to strike man-
kind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure unreasonable and outra-
geous, showing the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prej-
udice or corruption."
Given this standard, it is hard to imagine that any verdict should be set aside as
excessive. The Supreme Court also relied on the fact that the trial court had
denied the defendant's motion for new trial, and it stressed that the trial court
had the advantage in ruling on a motion for new trial of having heard the evi-
dence in the case and seen the witnesses testify."°
There were two cases decided during the past year that dealt with arbitra-
tions, which are increasingly being used as an alternative to trial. In Wilkinson
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,"° a securities broker invoked an arbitration
provision when one of its customers sued it over its handling of the customer's
IRA account. The Supreme Court decided that the dispute over the IRA account
was not subject to arbitration. Although the customer had agreed to arbitrate
disputes arising under other accounts with the broker, he had never agreed to
submit disputes arising out of the IRA account to arbitration. 5 While there is
a strong policy favoring arbitration, this applies only if the parties have agreed
to submit their dispute to arbitration. In contrast, in Pierman v. Green Tree Fin.
Servicing Corp.,"6 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial
98. See id. at 1, 928 P.2d at 965.
99. See id. at 415-6, 928 P.2d at 965-66.
100. 1997 OK 58, 939 P.2d 1138.
101. See Dodson v. Henderson Properties, Inc., 1985 OK 71, 11, 708 P.2d 1064, 1068 ("A court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the jury in the exercise of its function as a fact finding body.").
102. 1997 OK 58, 110,939 P.2d at 1141.
103. See id. at 19, 939 P.2d at 1141.
104. 1997 OK 20, 933 P.2d 878.
105. See id. at 10, 933 P.2d at 880.
106. 1997 OK Cv APP 2, 933 P.2d 955.
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court for not ordering arbitration, because the parties had entered into an agree-
ment with an arbitration provision that covered the claims asserted by the plain-
tiff. The arbitration provision in the Pierman case was included in a financing
agreement for the purchase of a boat trailer. The financing agreement called for
the purchaser to maintain insurance coverage on the trailer, and it granted the
lender the right to purchase insurance if the purchaser failed to do so. Claiming
the insurance charged under the financing agreement was excessive, the plaintiff
alleged a variety of claims against the lender's assignee that sounded both in
tort and contract."t 7 Even though some of the claims were based on tort theo-
ries, the Court of Civil Appeals decided that they all arose out of the financing
agreement and therefore they were covered by the arbitration provision."'
Several recent decisions concerned the law of remedies, ranging from lis
pendens to the award of costs, interest, and attorney fees. These are analyzed
below.
VI. REMEDMIS
The filing of a lis pendens notice is the usual procedure for preventing
bona fide purchasers or mortgagors from acquiring an interest in property that is
the subject of litigation."° In Breeding v. NJH Enterpris, LLC,"° the
Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that a mortgagor with actual notice of a prior
action was bound by it even though the plaintiff failed to file a lis pendens
notice. The prior action was a divorce proceeding that was pending at the time
the husband executed a mortgage on the marital homestead. In the appeal from
the divorce action, the Supreme Court increased the wife's property award by
$100,000 and secured it with a lien on the homestead. On the second appeal in
the case, the Supreme Court ruled that the wife's lien was superior to the mort-
gage that was recorded before the appeal was decided because the mortgagor
had actual notice of the divorce action.' It held that lis pendens was an equi-
table doctrine and that it would be inequitable not to apply the doctrine of lis
pendens on account of the plaintiff's failure to record the lis pendens notice
when the mortgagor had actual notice of the prior action."'
The Supreme Court struck down a local rule for Tulsa County"' that as-
signed all post judgment collection matters to special judges in Schulmeier v.
Honorable Judges of District Court."4 It held that the local rule was inconsis-
tent with the limitations on the authority of special judges in section 123 of title
107. See id. at 3, 933 P.2d at 956.
108. See id. at 18, 933 P.2d at 957.
109. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2004.2 (1991).
110. 1997 OK 65, 940 P.2d 502.
111. See id. at IF, 940 P.2d at 504.
112. See id. at IF1, 940 P.2d at 504.
113. R. 23(5), Rules of the Fourteenth Jud. Dist. (Tulsa and Pawnee Counties).
114. 1996 OK 103, 925 P.2d 63.
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Bohnefeld v. Haney"6 presented issues involving the calculation of pre-
judgment interest and the shifting of costs under section 1101 of title 12."7
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals noted a split of authority between two of
its divisions concerning the method for calculating prejudgment interest. One
division applied the single annual rate of interest that was in effect at the time
of the verdict to all of the years between the date of the filing of the petition
and the verdict,"' while the other division applied the different annual interest
rates for each year from the date of the filing of the action."9 The Bohnefeld
court adopted the latter approach, reasoning that the plaintiff's loss should be
measured by the yearly value of money for each period that the plaintiff was
deprived of its use. After the Bohnefeld decision, the Oklahoma Legislature
amended section 727 of title 12 to codify its result.'
The other issue addressed in Bohnefeld was whether the trial judge should
compare the defendant's offer of judgment to the jury's verdict or to the judg-
ment, which included prejudgment interest, in determining which party was
entitled to costs. Referring to the statutory language,' the Court of Civil Ap-
peals decided that the offer of judgment should be compared to the plaintiff's
judgment, including prejudgment interest." Accordingly, it decided that the
plaintiff was entitled to costs because the judgment exceeded the defendant's
offer.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals examined the attorney fees provi-
sions of section 936 of title 12'2 in American Superior Feeds, Inc. v. Mason
Warehouse, Inc.24 It held that an award of attorney fees to the prevailing par-
ty is mandatory under section 936, and also that the prevailing party is the one
who obtains the greatest affirmative judgment." Thus, a plaintiff can be a
prevailing party even if the defendant prevails on some of the claims.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in Professional Credit Collections,
Inc. v. Smith" that a defendant who succeeded in vacating a default judgment
against her was a prevailing party. Consequently, the defendant was entitled to
recover her attorney fees from the plaintiff under section 936 of title 12."2
The Supreme Court decided that a party need not obtain a judgment in its favor
in order to be the prevailing party. It stated: "The operative factor under § 936
115. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 123 (1991).
116. 1996 OK Civ APP 141,931 P.2d 90.
117. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101 (1991).
118. See McMullen v. Stevens, 1995 OK Civ APP 8, 17, 895 P.2d 302, 304-5.
119. See Burwell v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 1995 OK Civ APP 50, (25, 896 P.2d 1195.
120. See OKLA STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (Supp. 1997).
121. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1101 (1991).
122. Id. at 9, 931 P.2d at 91.
123. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1991).
124. 943 P.2d 171 (Okla. Ct. App. 1997).
125. See id. at 173.
126. 1997 OK 19, 933 P.2d 307.
127. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1991).
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is success, not the particular stage at which success is achieved. ' ' " Thus, the
Supreme Court would appear to have allowed the defendant to recover attorney
fees incurred in vacating the default judgment, even if the plaintiff later ob-
tained a judgment against the defendant. The Professional Credit decision
would also appear to permit a party who prevailed on a provisional remedy
(such as an attachment," prejudgment garnishment" or a temporary injunc-
tion') to recover attorney fees even though it did not prevail at the trial on
the merits. It might even mean that a plaintiff who succeeded in defending a
motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion could be considered a pre-
vailing party.
The Supreme Court's decision is wrong analytically because a party who
had an adverse judgment vacated but ultimately lost on the merits could not be
considered to have prevailed. Moreover, the decision will likely open a can of
worms because it will require trial courts to determine who the prevailing par-
ties are and assess attorney fees at multiple stages in the course of litigation. A
better way for the Supreme Court to have decided the case would have been for
it to rule that the defendant was the prevailing party on account of the
plaintiff's voluntary dismisssal, which terminated the litigation, rather than on
account of the order vacating the default judgment, which did not.
Section 696.4(B) of title 12132 provides a thirty day time limit after the
filing of a judgment for filing an application for attorney fees. In Victore Insur-
ance Co. v. Foster,' a plaintiff's motion for attorney fees was filed more
than two years after the entry of a default judgment, but the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals ruled that the motion was not barred because section 696.4 was
not in effect at the time of the judgment. 34 Section 696.4 did apply, however,
in Ladder Energy Co. v. Intrust Bank, NA.35 The plaintiff in the Ladder case
filed an initial request for attorney fees within the thirty day time limit, and the
trial court granted the request. Then the plaintiff filed a second request for
attorney fees after the thirty days had expired, and it argued that the filing of
the second request related back to the filing of the initial request. Finding no
basis for the relation back argument, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
decided that the second request for attorney fees was barred by section
696.4(B). 36
128. Professional Credit Collections, Inc., 1997 OK 19, 112, 933 P.2d at 311.
129. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1151 (1991).
130. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1171(B)(1) (Supp. 1996).
131. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1384.1 (1991).
132. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.4(B) (Supp. 1996).
133. 1997 OK Civ APP 23, 940 P.2d 236.
134. See id. at V5, 940 P.2d at 237-8.
135. 1996 OK Civ APP 126, 931 P.2d 83.
136. See id. at 8, 931 P.2d at 86.
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VII. JUDGMENT AND SETTLEMENT
Rule 4(e) of the Oklahoma District Court Rules'37 provides that if no
brief or list of authorities is filed in opposition to a motion (other than certain
specified motions for which no brief or list of authorities is required), "the
motion shall be deemed confessed." Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals decided in Westlake Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Cornforth that the
lack of a timely response to a motion to vacate a judgment did not prevent a
trial court from having discretion to review the motion to ensure that it did not
violate the law by granting the relief requested in the motion. The case arose
out of a small claims action brought by a church in which the trial court entered
a judgment in favor of the church and the judgment was affirmed by the Okla-
homa Court of Civil Appeals. After the appeal became final, the church began
proceedings to enforce the judgment. The defendant then filed a motion to
vacate the judgment, but the church failed to file a timely response to the mo-
tion because the defendant had informed the church that he was filing bankrupt-
cy.'39 The trial court denied the motion to vacate, and the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed. It noted that Oklahoma courts had previously ruled that
motions for summary judgment, Spirgis v. Circle K Stores, Inc.,"4 and for
new trial, Pipes v. Smith, 4' would not be deemed confessed because of a fail-
ure to file a timely response. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reasoned
that the Oklahoma Legislature had specified the grounds for certain motions,
such as for new trial and the vacation of judgments, and that Rule 4(e) should
not prevent a court from ensuring that these statutory grounds were satis-
fied.142
Nichols v. Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co.43 turned on two different sorts
of waiver. The case dealt with the effect of a settlement of the plaintiff's claim
against one party on the plaintiff's claims against other parties and also the
settled-law-of-the-case doctrine. The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that the
defendant had in effect waived the right to a credit of the settlement against the
judgment because it failed to object to the form of the verdict,' which did not
list the settling defendant as a tortfeasor.1" It also ruled that the plaintiff had
in effect waived the right to relief from the Court of Appeals decision to credit
the settlement against a part of the judgment because the plaintiff failed to seek
certiorari from the Court of Appeals decision.4
The plaintiffs in Nichols brought nuisance and negligence claims against
137. See Okla. Dist. Ct. R. 4(e), OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 2, app. (1991).
138. 940 P.2d 1208 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).
139. See id. at 1209.
140. 1987 OK Civ APP 45, 19, 743 P.2d 682 (Approved for Publication by the Supreme Court).
141. 1987 OK CIv APP 66, 16, 743 P.2d 1110.
142. See Westlake Presbyterain Church, Inc., 940 P.2d at 1210.
143. 1996 OK 118, 933 P.2d 272.
144. See id. at 126, 933 P.2d at 281.
145. See id. at 127, 933 P.2d at 281.
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three defendants. One of the defendants settled with the plaintiff before trial.
After the jury returned a verdict against the other defendants for both actual and
punitive damages, the trial court deducted the amount of the settlement from the
verdict. On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals determined that the trial
court should not have credited a portion of the settlement against the punitive
damages award, but it sustained the crediting of a portion of the settlement
against the actual damages award.1" One of the defendants sought certiorari to
the Supreme Court, but the plaintiffs did not seek certiorari with respect to the
actual damages award. 47
The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the settling defendant was not a
joint tortfeasor with the other defendants because the jury verdict exonerated the
settling defendant from liability for the plaintiff's injury." It stated that if the
defendant who remained in the case had wanted to obtain a credit for the settle-
ment, that defendant should have pressed for the jury to find that the settling
defendant was partially liable by objecting to the trial court's form of the ver-
dict that excluded the settling defendant from liability. 49 The Supreme Court
concluded that since the settling defendant was not a joint tortfeasor the settle-
ment should not have affected the judgment under the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act. As a result, the plaintiff was entitled to collect the full
amount from the other defendants, without any credit or reduction for the
amount of the settlement pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act in section 832 of title 12."5
The Supreme Court also decided that although the plaintiffs were entitled
to relief with respect to the credit for punitive damages they were not entitled to
relief with respect to the credit for actual damages because the plaintiffs failed
to seek certiorari from the Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision. It held that the
plaintiffs were barred by the settled-law-of-the-case doctrine which precludes
relitigation of any issues that are either finally settled in the process of appellate
review or that an aggrieved party fails to raise in the course of appellate re-
view.' The settled-law-of-the-case doctrine was also applied in Lockhart v.
Loosen. 1
2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Pre-
ferred Packaging, Inc.' that the plaintiff was entitled to only one recovery
for alternative legal theories that were predicated on the same set of facts. One
of the defendants in the Green Bay case alleged that the plaintiff's employees
made a number of statements to the effect that the defendant and his company
were on the verge of business ruin, and the defendant asserted counterclaims for
146. See id. at €16, 933 P.2d at 275-76.
147. See id. at 124, 933 P.2d at 281.
148. See id. at 116, 933 P.2d at 279.
149. See id. at 119, 933 P.2d at 280.
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 832 (1991).
151. See Nichols, 1996 OK 118, 124, 933 P.2d at 281.
152. 1997 OK 103, 3 n.1, 943 P.2d 1074.
153. 1996 OK 121, 932 P.2d 1091.
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interference with business relations and defamation on account of these state-
ments. The jury returned verdicts for $3 million on both counterclaims, which
the trial court entered, but the Supreme Court reversed as to the defamation
counterclaim because it arose of the same facts as the counterclaim for interfer-
ence with business relations. 4 Accordingly, it was only an alternative theory
of relief, rather than a separate cause of action.
In Deloney v. Downey,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed the
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion in the context of a paternity action
brought by a minor child against a man who had never been married to her
mother. The defendant contended that the paternity action was precluded by the
decree in the divorce proceeding between the child's mother and the former
husband of the child's mother. The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that
neither claim nor issue preclusion applied. Claim preclusion was not applicable
because the child was not a party to the divorce proceeding, nor was the child
in privity to the parties to the divorce proceeding. 6 The test that the Supreme
Court used to determine whether a person was in privity to a party to a prior
action was whether there was an identity of interests between the person sought
to be precluded and the party."5 7 In the Deloney case, the child's interests did
not coincide with either her mother's or the former husband's interests because
there were several potential benefits, such as possible inheritance or other death
benefits, that could flow to the child, but not to her mother, if the defendant's
paternity were established. Issue preclusion was not applicable, both because the
child was not a party to the divorce proceeding and also because the issue of
the child's paternity was not actually litigated in the divorce proceeding."5 8
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also analyzed the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion in National Diversified Business Services, Inc. v. Corporate Fin. Opportu-
nities, Inc.'59 Both of the actions that the plaintiff brought against the defen-
dants arose out of a written brokerage agreement between the parties. The plain-
tiff alleged claims for breach of contract and fraud in its first action, which was
filed in an Oklahoma state court. The trial court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss without prejudice on account of a forum selection clause in the con-
tract, which required actions on the contract to be filed in Texas."W In the sec-
ond action, which was also filed in an Oklahoma state court, the plaintiff
changed its theory from fraud and breach of contract to statutory violations of
the Oklahoma Business Opportunity Sales Act and added two of the original
defendant's agents as parties, but it alleged many of the same facts and sought
the same relief as in the first suit." The Supreme Court ruled that the second
154. See id. at 30, 932 P.2d at 1097.
155. 1997 OK 102, 944 P.2d 312.
156. See id. at 17, 944 P.2d at 318.
157. See id. at 9122, 944 P.2d 319.
158. See id. at 118, 944 P.2d at 318.
159. 1997 OK 36, 946 P.2d 662.
160. See id. at 94, 946 P.2d at 664.
161. See id. at 117, 946 P.2d at 668.
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action was barred by issue preclusion. It held that the trial court's decision in
the first action that the forum selection clause required dismissal was binding in
the second action, even though the earlier dismissal was without prejudice. If
the plaintiff wanted to overturn the dismissal it should have filed an appeal,
rather than filing a second action arising from the contract that alleged a differ-
ent theory of liability but sought the same relief.62
VIii. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The most notable developments concerning appellate procedure during the
past year concerned the giving of notice of the filing of a judgment to the par-
ties to an action. The date of the filing of a judgment is significant under the
Judgments Act," because the time for filing appeals'" and post-trial mo-
tions" begins to run from this date. Prior to the statutory amendments that
were made during the 1997 Legislative Session, there was no provision for the
giving of notice of the filing of the judgment, except in cases that were taken
under advisement, where the court was required to cause file stamped copies of
the judgment to be mailed to all parties." In Bushert v. Hughes,67 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an attorney who approved a judgment or
appealable order had a duty to monitor the court clerk's office for the filing of
the judgment because the statute had no provision that required the giving of
notice of the filing.
Also, in Joiner v. Brown," the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the
court clerk had a responsibility to mail file-stamped copies of judgments and
appealable orders to all parties whose names and addresses were listed on the
journal entry when it was filed. The court clerks in the 77 counties in Oklaho-
ma developed different procedures to implement the Joiner ruling, but they
experienced some practical difficulties in doing so. A series of amendments
were made to the Judgments Act during the 1997 Legislative Session,'69
which provided relief for both attorneys and court clerks. These amendments
require whoever prepares a judgment to see that file stamped copies are mailed
to all parties, who are not in default for failure to appear, within three days
after the filing and to file a proof of service.77 The consequence of failing to
mail the file stamped copies of the judgment within three days of the filing is
that the time to file appeals and post-trial motions will not begin to run until
162. See id. at 114, 946 P.2d at 667.
163. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 696.2-696.4 (Supp. 1996).
164. See OKLA. STAT. lit. 12, § 990A (Supp. 1996).
165. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 653 (motions for new trial), 698 (judgment notwithsdanding verdict),
1031.1 (term time motion to vacate judgment), 1038 (motion to vacate judgment) (Supp. 1996).
166. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 696.2B (Supp. 1996) (amended 1997).
167. 1996 OK 21, 912 P.2d 334.
168. 1996 OK 112, 925 P.2d 888.
169. Act of April 15, 1997, ch. 102, §§ 1-7, 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws 320, 320-28.
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the mailing is done."'
Under section 994 of title 12," the time to appeal from a judgment does
not begin to run until all the claims in the case are resolved. This statute con-
trolled the outcome of two recent decisions of the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals. In Heitman v. Brown," the trial court granted a partial summary
judgment by default in an ejectment action with respect to the issue whether the
parties had a common law marriage. The defendant's motion to vacate the
partial summary judgment was denied. The trial court later entered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant filed a timely appeal from the judg-
ment. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decided that the denial of the
motion to vacate the partial summary judgment was not a final appealable or-
der." Accordingly, it could review the denial of the motion to vacate in the
appeal from the judgment. In Huebert v. Prime Operating Co.,75 the trial
court granted the defendants' summary judgment motions with respect to the
plaintiffs' claims against them, but it did not dispose of a cross-claim by one
defendant against another. Because the trial court had not resolved the cross-
claim, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal of
the summary judgment with respect to their claims. '76
Bank IV v. Southwestern Bank & Trust Co." was concerned with ascer-
taining which document constituted a judgment for purposes of commencing the
thirty day time to appeal. The trial judge in the Bank IV case sustained a mo-
tion for summary judgment by filing a handwritten order on a minute order
form on which the judge had crossed out the word "minute" and written in the
word "order". A copy of the order was sent to the parties, and a journal entry
of judgment was later filed. The defendant filed its petition in error more than
thirty days after the filing of the judge's order but within thirty days of the
filing of the journal entry of judgment. The Supreme Court decided that the
appeal was timely because the filing of the judge's order was not an appealable
event..7 It reasoned that the judge's order constituted an order for the prevail-
ing party to prepare a journal entry of judgment on account of Rule 12 of the
Local Rules for Oklahoma County,1" which requires a prevailing party to pre-
pare a journal entry and present it to the other parties within 10 days of the
ruling on a motion.' ° Thus, the time to appeal ran from the filing of the jour-
nal entry, rather than the filing of the judge's order.'
171. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 653, 698, 990A, 1031.1 (Supp. 1997), 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch.
102, §§ 1, 3-7, 320, 320-27 (West).
172. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 994 (Supp. 1996).
173. 1996 OK Civ APP 148, 933 P.2d 948.
174. See id. at 115, 933 P.2d at 950.
175. 1996 OK Civ APP 121, 926 P.2d 810.
176. See id. at 516, 926 P.2d at 812.
177. 1997 OK 31, 935 P.2d 323.
178. See id. at I6, 935 P.2d at 325.
179. R. 12, Rules of the Seventh Jud. Dist. (Oklahoma and Canadian Counties).
180. See Bank IV, 1997 OK 31, 111, 935 P.2d at 326.
181. See id. at 112, 935 P.2d at 326.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The most noteworthy development relating to civil procedure during the
past year was probably the Oklahoma Supreme Court's adoption of the public
domain citation form. While citation form is purely a formal exercise, the pub-
lic domain citation system will appear in all future opinions of the Oklahoma
appellate courts and will be required in all future briefs that are submitted to the
appellate courts. Undoubtedly, it will spread to trial court briefs and law office
memoranda in Oklahoma and eventually to the federal courts and the courts of
other jurisdictions.
The statutory amendments relating to the giving of notice of the filing of
judgments corrected a problem that had arisen with appellate procedure that was
threatening to cause further problems at the trial court level. Because the statute
did not provide for the giving of notice of the filing of judgments, some appel-
lants were not receiving this notice, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
issued an opinion that required the court clerks to provide this notice. The
amendments shifted the responsibility for giving notice from the court clerk to
the attorney or other person who filed the judgments.
Most of the cases that the Oklahoma appellate courts decided during the
past year involved the application of settled legal principles. The notable excep-
tion was YMCA v. Melson,1 which overruled a long standing precedent to
allow discovery of a defendant's financial records in a case where the plaintiff
is seeking punitive damages. Although a number of the other cases are instruc-
tive, they did not overrule any prior law or break any significant legal ground.
182. 1997 OK 81, 1997 WL 366099.
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